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DEDICATION  
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
 
The editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review dedicate 
the law review’s inaugural Supreme Court issue to Justice John Paul 
Stevens, upon his retirement from the bench and in honor of his 
incredible and lasting contributions to the legal community. The 
issue includes dedication letters from President Bill Clinton, Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Justice Sonia Sotomayor, as well as 
dedication letters and essays written by Justice Stevens’ former 
clerks Susan R. Estrich, Michael J. Gottlieb, Abner S. Greene, Jamal 
Greene, Melissa Hart, Amanda Leiter, Gregory P. Magarian, Nancy 
S. Marder, David Pozen, Adam M. Samaha, and Samuel Spital. 
 
 
*** 
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My sincere thanks to each of my former colleagues for your 
kind words and, more importantly, for your superb contributions to 
the work of the Court. 
 
 
Sincerely, 
 
John Paul Stevens 
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President Bill Clinton 
Capturing the essence of any career in a handful of paragraphs is 
never simple. The accumulated disappointments and triumphs would 
provide the underpinnings of an epic novel. When the subject has 
served an extraordinary three and a half decades on the nation’s 
highest court, the challenge would seem to be all the greater. 
The task is actually easier with Justice John Paul Stevens 
because he has written his own way into history. His opinions, 
whether for the majority in concurrence or in sometimes scathing 
dissent, are free of bombast and five-dollar words. They provide a 
clear view of the philosophy he applied to the cases before him, and 
what he believed to be their historical significance. 
That the third-longest serving justice in the history of the Court 
would turn out to be one of its most gifted legal writers was no 
surprise to anyone who was paying attention in the fall of 1975. A 
Time magazine article on Gerald Ford’s nomination of Stevens 
wrapped up with a glowing admiration from Philip Kurland, the 
University of Chicago's constitutional expert. Kurland, who had little 
patience for sloppily-written legal opinions, seemed nearly giddy at 
the prospect of a new justice who could write well. 
At the time of the Stevens nomination, I was a young law 
professor at the University of Arkansas Law School at Fayetteville. I 
had been recommended for the job by my Corporate and Tax Law 
professor at Yale, in spite of the fact that he had once reprimanded 
me for reading Gabriel Garcia Marquez’ One Hundred Years of 
Solitude in class instead of focusing on his lecture. While I should 
have been, like Kurland, paying closer attention to the nomination, at 
least I was an unapologetic fan of great writing. 
After the recent storm over President Ford’s pardon of Richard 
Nixon, I, like much of the country, briefly noted with appreciation 
Stevens’ considerable qualifications and left it at that. The Senate 
was similarly impressed, and confirmed him quickly, and by a 
margin of 98–0. 
That vote of confidence proved to be fully justified. Over the 
next thirty-five years, John Paul Stevens, in his questions from the 
bench and in his written opinions, gave a voice to those without a 
platform of their own: the ordinary citizens, the underrepresented, 
the victims of bigotry, the prisoners and the pariahs, and he did so in 
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words full of clarity and conviction. 
Although Justice Stevens evolved in stark contrast to the 
rightward push of the Court’s conservative majority, he maintained 
an impressive ability to frame coalitions around practical, common-
sense positions. When he couldn’t bridge the divide, he dissented in 
opinions that were combative and, I believe, prophetic. The boy who 
witnessed Babe Ruth’s famous “called shot” in the 1932 World 
Series never hesitated to call them the way he saw them. 
Justice Stevens’ opinions are never loosely reasoned or 
decorated with affected prose. Like all great writers, he brings clarity 
to the indistinct and resolution to the tenuous. A jurist who can do 
this strengthens the foundations of our democracy, and assures even 
more firmly our rights for future generations. 
A good illustration of Justice Stevens’ special talent is his 
famous dissent—later vindicated by the ruling’s reversal—in Bowers 
v. Hardwick: 
 
“Although the meaning of the principle that ‘all men are 
created equal’ is not always clear, it surely must mean that 
every free citizen has the same interest in ‘liberty’ that the 
members of the majority share.” 
 
You can hardly imagine a more clear affirmation of another 
brilliant legal writer, working in seclusion in June of 1776. Like 
Thomas Jefferson, Justice Stevens labored long and well to ensure 
that the rights his words described were extended to all citizens and 
would continue to be after he ended his service. 
I am honored to join with the distinguished faculty and 
administration of the Loyola University of Los Angeles Law School 
in dedicating this special issue of the Law Review to the career and 
jurisprudence of Justice John Paul Stevens. I hope that those of us 
who contributed to it have done justice to his ideas, his eloquence, 
his way of making decisions and writing them down in clear, strong 
language. Justice Stevens’ special qualities are gifts for which we 
should be grateful and which we all should strive to emulate. 
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Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg* 
Five years ago, in a letter applauding Justice Stevens’ 30-year 
tenure on the Court, President Gerald Ford commented that Supreme 
Court nominations are seldom considered when historians assess 
Presidencies.1 “Let that not be the case with my Presidency,” Ford 
continued, “[f]or I am prepared to allow history’s judgment of my 
term in office to rest (if necessary, exclusively) on my 
nomination . . . of Justice John Paul Stevens to the U.S. Supreme 
Court.”2 Legions of lawyers and judges would concur heartily in 
President Ford’s praise for the “dignity, intellect[,] and [absence of] 
partisan political concerns”3 that characterized Justice Stevens’ 
service on the Court. 
Expressing my affection and admiration for my dear colleague, I 
wrote to Justice Stevens on the day he told us of his decision to 
retire: 
 
You are the very best of jurists, and I will so miss your 
bright company. From my first year [at the Court], you have 
been my model of how a collegial judge should behave. 
Work from other chambers invariably took precedence over 
all else on your agenda. I could not match the immediacy of 
your responses to circulating opinions, but I have tried to be 
a respectful second.4 
 
“Humility, not haughtiness,” one of Justice Stevens’ law clerks 
observed, “marked his career on the Court.”5 In a Capital City with 
no shortage of self promoters, Justice Stevens set a different tone. 
Quick as his bright mind is, and fluent as his pen (or keyboard) is in 
drafting opinions, Justice Stevens remains a genuinely gentle and 
modest man. No jurist with whom I have served was more dedicated 
to the judicial craft, more open to what he called “learning on the 
 
 * Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States. 
 1. President Ford’s letter is quoted in William Michael Treanor, Introduction to Symposium 
on the Jurisprudence of Justice Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1557, 1559 (2006). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Letter on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review. 
 5. Diane Marie Amann, John Paul Stevens, Human Rights Judge, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1569, 1569 (2006). 
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job,”6 more sensitive to the well being of the community law exists 
to serve. 
His manner at oral argument typified both his civility and the 
quality of his mind. He preceded his questions with the politest “May 
I, . . .,” then invited advocates to train their attention sharply on the 
precise issue likely to be dispositive. 
Justice Stevens was not given to stock formulas that sometimes 
obscure the true basis for a Court’s decision. He insisted that 
analysis, not habit, should inform the Court’s judgments.7 His 
opinions, sometimes prophetic, often pathmarking, will continue to 
challenge and inspire jurists for generations to come. 
 
 6. John Paul Stevens, Learning on the Job, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1561 (2006). 
 7. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 222 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (“It is fair to infer that habit, rather than analysis or actual reflection, made it seem 
acceptable to equate the terms ‘widow’ and ‘dependent surviving spouse.’”). 
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Justice Sonia Sotomayor* 
Justice John Paul Stevens: Teaching By Example 
Working with Justice Stevens is among the most profound 
experiences of my career. And his retirement from the Court is one 
of the saddest. I feel fortunate beyond words to have spent almost a 
year working with this great man. He was most welcoming when I 
arrived at the Court, and through our conversations and other 
opportunities to observe him at work, I learned things that cannot be 
taught except by example. 
Almost everyone to describe Justice Stevens remarks 
immediately on his decency and humility. It is no wonder, as he 
possesses each of these traits in unusual abundance. But this 
description does not begin to capture the complexities of the Justice’s 
character or the depth of his work. 
As his opinions show, there seemingly is no subject that does 
not interest Justice Stevens. And certainly there is none that he 
cannot master. This is as true of non-legal subjects as it is of legal 
ones. Consider that this man who lived through prohibition and the 
advent of television was one of the first Justices to comprehend the 
operation and significance of the Internet. And his understanding of 
electioneering in the age of political action committees is arguably 
unsurpassed. 
Perhaps more striking than his command of the law is the 
Justice’s indomitable sense of fairness. Despite all his years working 
in such a grand building removed from so much of society, Justice 
Stevens never lost sight of what some might consider smaller causes. 
To him, unfairness or injustice even on an individual scale seemed 
always to merit serious consideration. It is often said that the U.S. 
Supreme Court is not a court of error correction. But that is not 
entirely true, and Justice Stevens had a particular instinct for 
identifying those errors that warranted further review even absent a 
circuit split, a large amount in controversy, or the involvement of a 
public figure. 
The Justice never told me so directly, but I sensed that his 
attention to these cases was in part a response to his view of the 
 
 * Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States. Justice Sotomayor gratefully 
acknowledges the assistance of her 2009 Term law clerk, Lindsey Powell. 
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Court’s role in our society. He seemed to treat the protection of 
individual rights granted by the Constitution as a sacred obligation of 
our courts. His writings reflect a concern that, if the courts neglect 
that obligation, it is uncertain whether other institutions would 
respect those rights in their work, and our society would be the worse 
for it. 
In keeping with this commitment to the integrity of the courts, 
Justice Stevens has been a lifelong devotee of the rule of law. He 
built his professional reputation in large part on his representation of 
the Greenberg Commission, which investigated allegations of 
judicial misconduct by Illinois Supreme Court justices. The Justice’s 
rigorous and fair approach to the investigation captured the public’s 
attention and propelled his rise to the bench. Over the years, Justice 
Stevens has remained loyal to these founding principles of his career. 
Notably, the decisions of the Supreme Court with which the Justice 
most adamantly disagreed are, by and large, those which he feared 
would be perceived as being influenced by factors other than fidelity 
to the rule of law. 
In addition to his decency and humility, Justice Stevens is 
widely known as a free thinker. Although long considered the leader 
of the Court’s so-called liberal wing, in many cases the Justice did 
not hesitate to stake out an opinion favored only by him or by one 
other Justice. Whether due to his close reading of the facts, his 
firsthand experience of the law’s evolution in an area, or a singular 
approach to a legal doctrine, Justice Stevens often had a different 
take, and he would not hesitate to say so. Famously, some of his 
dissenting views became majorities over time, as seen in the Court’s 
shift from Bowers v. Hardwick to Lawrence v. Texas. Even when 
they have not carried the day, the Justice’s steady stream of separate 
writings have challenged the other writers on the Court and 
inevitably shaped their views. 
It would be easy to underestimate the extent of this achievement. 
In an institution that operates by reference to majorities and 
traditions, the temptation to abandon individual efforts is substantial. 
The Court’s extraordinarily heavy workload further augments the 
allure of agreement. Justice Stevens’ intellectual advantages, 
including his near-photographic memory, surely made the project of 
writing separately somewhat easier for him. But it is no small feat to 
remain faithful, year after year, to the project of going it alone. 
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This fidelity to principle should not be confused with rigidity. 
Quite the contrary. In remarks made at the Symposium on The 
Jurisprudence of Justice Stevens, which was held at Fordham 
University School of Law on September 30, 2005, Justice Stevens 
described the ongoing learning process he engaged in while serving 
on the bench. In part, the Justice was making a statement about the 
relevance of certain types of questions during confirmation hearings. 
But the Justice’s point was also a deeply personal one. Not only is 
“learning on the job . . . essential to the process of judging,” he said, 
it has also been “one of the most important and rewarding aspects of 
[his] own experience over the last thirty-five years.” This was 
evident to me even in the brief time Justice Stevens and I served 
together. Although he never said so, I suspect that the Justice’s 
unusually careful attention to the facts of each case—a practice that 
others have so often noted—is part of what helped him to judge each 
case only as it was presented and to learn as he went. 
Work at the Court involves long hours spent poring over often 
gruesome facts. For this reason, among others, one can imagine the 
Court’s workload taking a toll over time. Yet, despite his unusually 
long tenure as a Justice, there is no evidence that Justice Stevens felt 
burdened or allowed himself to grow cynical. The Justice continued 
to engage, with every appearance of fresh eyes and a buoyant spirit, 
the facts of each case, and he would call attention to their 
inconsistencies and injustices more often than any other member of 
the Court. 
Justice Stevens will continue to make substantial contributions 
to the law in his retirement. He remains a tireless participant in legal 
discourse, and the legacy of his decisions and his character will 
always deeply impact the Court’s work. I know that I will routinely 
return to his writings and example as I continue my own evolution as 
a Justice. 
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Susan R. Estrich* 
A Lawyer on the Court 
To be honest, I wasn’t entirely sure about Justice Stevens when I 
first went to work as his law clerk, three decades ago. My first choice 
was Justice Brennan but in those days, he didn’t hire women. 
“Nothing personal,” I was told. Justice Stevens, having been on the 
High Court all of one year and change at the time, seemed a tad 
conservative to me: appointed by a Republican, opposed by the 
National Organization for Women on the grounds that his opinions 
on the Seventh Circuit (particularly in one case brought by 
stewardesses) were insufficiently supportive of women’s rights. On 
the other hand, at least he hired women. 
Early on in my clerkship, the Justice explained his philosophy to 
my co-clerk and me. In almost every case, he said, if you look hard 
enough and think hard enough, there is a “right” answer. I could 
barely keep a straight face. A “right” answer? What could be more 
ridiculous? I had been taught—and not just by the critical legal 
studies people who were then on-the-rise at Harvard—that it was all 
politics, or values if you prefer, that you could argue almost anything 
from one side or the other, and the “answer” was itself a choice. It 
took me almost thirty years, and full-time practice for the last three, 
to understand what Justice Stevens meant. Not surprisingly, he was 
right. 
To be sure, there are instances where the “law” could indeed go 
either way, where, as a lawyer, you can honestly say that the chances 
of winning are 50-50, or depend almost entirely (and only) on which 
judge or judges are sitting in the room. But most of the time, 
particularly in business litigation, that just isn’t the case. There is a 
better answer, not a more liberal or conservative one, but one that 
makes sense of a statutory scheme, serves the goals of that scheme, 
reflects the concerns expressed in past opinions. Indeed, the rule of 
law, by which I mean the system of treating like cases alike, and the 
predictability which that allows to parties entering into contracts, 
making deals, running businesses, depends on the law being 
something much more than a coin toss. 
 
 * Clerk to Justice John Paul Stevens, October Term 1978. Robert Kingsley Professor of 
Law and Political Science, USC Gould School of Law.  
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Clerking for Justice Stevens was hard precisely because he 
didn’t decide who should win before he had read the cases. His 
judgments were made and opinions written with careful attention 
both to how lower courts would understand them, and even more 
perhaps, to how lawyers in practice could follow them. As he moved 
from junior Justice to becoming, of all things, the senior “liberal” on 
the Court, and got to assign himself opinions in more significant 
cases (the senior Justice assigns when the Chief Justice is on the 
dissenting side), the Justice’s determination to reach decisions and 
write opinions that made “lawyerly” sense became even clearer. His 
understanding that in law, as opposed to academics, facts really 
matter, line-drawing is inevitable, and “reasonableness” can be a 
standard that is more than a cover for political choices, infused his 
opinions. 
None of this might have mattered except for another lawyerly 
trait—or at least a trait of the great lawyers I have worked with and 
against. He believed in writing clearly. Simply. If you can’t say it 
simply, he would tell us, it’s probably because you haven’t got the 
argument right. A winning argument can be made in English; a 
losing one requires legalese. His insistence on writing clearly went 
hand-in-hand with his determination to find the “right” result, 
because that result should be easy to explain and support by 
reference to the words of the statute (say), the policies it serves, how 
it has been interpreted in the past, and the like. If you were struggling 
with an opinion, it was usually because there was something wrong 
with the opinion; if it “wouldn’t write,” as we used to say, it was 
probably because it shouldn’t. If you have to be glib to get by a 
point, you probably haven’t figured the point out right. Glibness is 
the last resort, the cover and not the answer. 
I think about Justice Stevens a lot lately, as I supervise young 
associates writing motions and briefs on a day-to-day basis. I think of 
him when they come to me and give me an answer to a legal question 
that just doesn’t seem, as he would say, “right”—that doesn’t make 
sense of the statute, serve the goals it is supposed to serve, seem 
consistent with the thrust of precedent, in other words, when the only 
thing that would make it “right” is that it helps our client. “Is this 
really the law?” I try to ask nicely, because it is obviously not our job 
in practice to decide what the law is, but to argue for our client. 
Usually it isn’t, which doesn’t mean you abandon your client, but 
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that you need to find another approach, rather than trying to push a 
sure loser up the hill. I think of him when I edit briefs with sentences 
so long that I can’t follow them; I remember when I used to write 
that way. Short sentences. Noun and verb. No flourishes. The 
greatest compliment the Justice used to give us was that a draft was 
simple, straightforward, easily followed and understood—and of 
course, right. 
 
 
 
*** 
 
 
 
Michael J. Gottlieb* 
A Tribute to Justice Stevens 
We have all received phone calls we will never forget. One of 
mine took place eight years ago. It was on June 23, 2003, a date 
some will associate with the announcement of significant equal 
protection decisions,8 but which I will always remember as the date I 
interviewed to clerk for Justice Stevens. 
I was only about a month out of law school when I was invited 
to interview with the Justice. I spent days poring over the Justice’s 
opinions, reviewing legal commentary, and anticipating possible 
questions. I barely slept out of a fear that I would appear unprepared. 
In retrospect, I would have been far better off had I simply called my 
family and studied the 1984 Chicago Cubs Playoffs roster. For, true 
to form, the Justice did not grill me on legal doctrine; rather, he 
focused on my upbringing, career aspirations, and interests outside of 
the law, including my favorite baseball team. 
When my phone rang later that afternoon, a voice instructed me 
to hold for Justice Stevens. Before I could catch my breath, the 
Justice came on the line and asked, “Mike, are you still interested in 
 
 * Clerk to Justice John Paul Stevens, October Term 2004. Special Assistant to the 
President and Associate Counsel to the President. The views expressed herein are solely those of 
the author in a personal capacity and do not reflect the views of any branch or agency of the 
United States Government. 
 8. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
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coming to work for me?” Having reassured him that my intent had 
not changed since earlier that day, he offered me the job with one 
caveat. “You can have the job,” he explained, “as long as you’re still 
a Cubs fan.” I told him that could probably be arranged. 
I had arrived at the Court on the morning of my interview 
knowing only those things about the Justice that could be gleaned 
from the public record. To be sure, I knew about his jurisprudence. 
But I had also learned of his patriotism—he served as a Naval 
cryptographer in World War Two; his brilliance—he received the 
best grades in the history of Northwestern Law School; his 
dedication to fitness—he had remained an accomplished golf and 
tennis player well into his eighties; and his distinctive fashion 
sense—he was the only Justice capable of pulling off his trademark 
bow tie. My clerkship confirmed that the Justice possesses all of 
those qualities in ample supply, yet they are not what I remember 
most. 
My fondest recollections are of working for a fundamentally 
kind, modest, and decent human being. Justice Stevens always paid 
attention to how we were doing and asked about our families. He 
noticed when we were sick or tired. Once, perceiving two of us to be 
sleep deprived, he utterly baffled us by offering to complete our cert 
petition work so we could go to sleep. The Justice is well known for 
signing “respectfully” at the end of every memo to his colleagues, 
but he is even better known for the sincerity with which he uses the 
word. Over the years, his colleagues have repeatedly praised his 
unyielding collegiality. The Justice always gave credit to his 
colleagues whose suggestions or criticisms helped improve his work. 
Never once did his disagreements make him disagreeable, even when 
confronting views that he described as “dead wrong.” 
Over more than three decades on the Court, Justice Stevens 
maintained a deliberately low public profile. I am partial to one 
anecdote from our Term. On the eve of the 2004 Presidential 
Election, my co-clerk and I stayed up late into the night monitoring 
ongoing litigation in Ohio. As the Circuit Justice for the Sixth and 
Seventh Circuits, Justice Stevens was called upon to decide a last- 
minute challenge relating to the presence of election monitors in 
polling stations. We exchanged drafts by email into the morning. The 
Justice’s opinion affirming the judgment below was released before 
the polls opened the next day. When Justice Stevens went to vote 
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near his home in Virginia, he found himself in line behind a man 
reading the newspaper. The man turned around, looked at the Justice, 
and said, “Did you see what the Supreme Court decided in the Ohio 
election case?” Justice Stevens played dumb; the other man never 
knew. 
During his time on the Court, Justice Stevens avoided black-tie 
galas, power lunches, and the speaking circuit. At the start of our 
Term, the Justice gave a speech in which he bragged, tongue in 
cheek, about his lavish summer during which he had read several 
books and traveled to the “exotic locale” of Chicago.9 His typical 
lunch consisted of a grapefruit enjoyed in the privacy of his office, 
with his colleagues following arguments, or in the courtyard with his 
clerks when the weather permitted. I will never forget when the 
Justice returned from the second inauguration of President George 
W. Bush in 2005. Of all things, he was fixated on the food at the 
congressional luncheon. Apparently, the shellfish spread was out of 
this world. 
Those of us lucky enough to have clerked for “JPS” know that 
he possesses more than raw brainpower. The Justice has never let go 
of his love of legal practice, which he first honed as an antitrust 
attorney in Chicago. Well into his twilight on the Court, the Justice 
continued to craft the first drafts of all his opinions, to test rigorously 
the strengths and weaknesses of the parties’ briefs both before and 
during oral arguments, and to read and reread cases from volumes of 
the United States Reports he would pull off the shelves in his office. 
But beyond his work ethic, the Justice displayed a genuine interest in 
the historical background to each case. It was not simply that he 
wanted to learn the record—he was legitimately excited about 
grasping the historical context that gave life to the particular dispute. 
For example, it was not the debate over the constitutionality of a Ten 
Commandments display that most attracted Justice Stevens’ attention 
in Van Orden v. Perry.10 Rather, in our many conversations about the 
case, the Justice returned most often to the unusual relationship 
between movie director Cecil B. DeMille and the Fraternal Order of 
Eagles, which had led to the original donation of the Ten 
 
 9. John Paul Stevens, What I Did This Summer, 18-OCT CBA REC., Oct. 2004, at 34, 35 
(2004). 
 10. 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Commandments monument to the state of Texas. It was not that 
discussions about the Establishment Clause bored the Justice—not at 
all—he just he had more fun reading and talking about DeMille and 
the Eagles. 
Those of us within the Stevens clerk family have always known 
his retirement was inevitable, though we would admit it only 
reluctantly. The inevitability of his departure, however, has made it 
no less easy to bear. We know that no one will be able to replicate 
the manner in which he could dismantle an argument with just one 
incisive question, which he always began with, “Might I just 
ask . . . .” We suspect that the Court will miss the Justice’s 
midwestern sensibilities, his unique perspective as the only 
remaining Justice to have served in the military, and his ability to see 
modern disputes in the context of the long arc of history. And, of 
course, we lament that the era of the bow-tie Justice has finally 
drawn to a close. 
True to my promise, I remained a Cubs fan. Near the end of our 
Term, to his great delight, the Justice was invited to throw out the 
first pitch at a Cubs game at Wrigley Field, the same stadium at 
which he watched Babe Ruth call his shot some seventy-three years 
before. The Justice, unwilling to disappoint his hometown crowd, 
decided to practice. And that is how, as my clerkship was in its final 
days, I found myself having a catch with Justice John Paul Stevens in 
the Supreme Court gymnasium. I did not attend the game. But I 
believe that, just as sure as Babe Ruth called his shot, Justice Stevens 
threw a strike. 
 
 
 
*** 
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Abner S. Greene* 
Dear Justice Stevens, 
When I first met you, we talked about law and baseball. The 
Court had just risen from OT 1985, and I was eager to chat with you 
about your brilliant separate opinion in Bowsher v. Synar. But there 
was that signed Chicago Cubs baseball on your desk, which was 
somewhat of a distraction. I also recall saying near the end that this 
might be my only chance to chat with a Supreme Court Justice, and 
would it be okay if I asked you a question. You said sure, and we 
talked a bit about what it was like to live in the world as a Supreme 
Court Justice—whether people treated you differently, whether you 
felt any restraints on where you could go and what you could do. 
I’m sure you cited some, but one of my fondest memories of 
clerking for you, starting a year later, was how important it was to 
you to have a life apart from your work. Some mornings you would 
come in from a tennis match with your archrival; some days we 
would chat about your bridge game or something that happened with 
the Cubs. (Probably not something good, usually :)) Since I play 
tennis and bridge, and am a baseball fan, I found all of this pretty 
thrilling. It made the work—the intense, wonderful, daily experience 
of talking law—fit with the rest of life. 
That integration of work and life not only made days and nights 
in your chambers particularly resonant for me, but also (as I’ve come 
to see) helped inform your jurisprudence. There is some debate about 
the use of emotion or sympathy in judging, and your ability to strike 
the perfect notes here is something to behold. Judging must be 
disinterested but it need not be dispassionate; it must apply the law, 
but it must not ignore facts. Especially in your eloquent writing 
(sadly, often dissenting) about the rights of prisoners and about 
capital punishment, you always remind us that the state wields 
enormous power and must turn very square corners. 
Your commitment to a jurisprudence of reasons—especially 
demanding that the state act for legitimate reasons, singling out 
neither friends nor enemies for specially favored or disfavored 
treatment—strikes me as the model of judgment. I believe that all of 
us who worked for you try to emulate that model in our work, and 
 
 * Clerk to Justice John Paul Stevens, October Terms 1987 and 1988. Leonard F. Manning 
Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. 
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our life, every day. It is a tough but worthy task. 
 
With warm wishes and best regards, 
 
Abner Greene (Law Clerk OT 1987 and 1988) 
 
 
 
*** 
 
 
 
Jamal Greene* 
Dear Justice Stevens, 
Babe Ruth, when asked to comment on the fact that his salary 
was higher than President Hoover’s, reportedly said, “Why not? I 
had a better year.” 
As the carefully filled-in scorecard on the wall of your chambers 
attests, Ruth’s life and yours once intersected. It was October 1, 
1932, at Wrigley Field in Chicago, in the fifth inning of Game 3 of 
the World Series between the Yankees and the Cubs. You, sitting in 
the crowd behind the third base line, were just twelve years old. The 
Bambino, at the plate, was in the winter of the greatest career the 
game has ever known. As you tell it, Ruth pointed toward the center 
field bleachers, and the rest was history. 
Ruth’s comment about Hoover betrays a cockiness that was 
every bit your opposite. But as I think back to my too-short year 
walking past that scorecard every day, I think of your own scorecard, 
and wonder whether you found some inspiration in that fleeting 
moment. 
I think of your 1975 opinion for a Seventh Circuit panel in 
Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hospital. In rejecting the claim of a 
substantive due process right of a father to be present in the delivery 
room of a public hospital, you expressed skepticism about framing 
such a right in “privacy” terms. You reframed it as an “interest in 
individual liberty that makes certain state intrusions on the citizen’s 
 
 * Clerk to Justice John Paul Stevens, October Term 2006. Associate Professor, Columbia 
Law School. 
  
830             LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:813 
right to decide how he will live his own life intolerable.” You 
repeated that view in your dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick, and Justice 
Kennedy specifically endorsed that dissent when the Court 
overturned Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas. 
Then there’s the single day in 1989 on which the Court decided, 
in Stanford v. Kentucky and Penry v. Lynaugh, that it was perfectly 
constitutional for a state to execute juveniles and the mentally 
retarded. You had written Thompson v. Oklahoma, barring the death 
penalty for children under sixteen, the previous Term, and you 
dissented in both Stanford and Penry. Thirteen years later you wrote 
Atkins v. Virginia, overruling Penry, and three years after that you 
joined Roper v. Simmons, overruling Stanford. 
Most remarkable, perhaps, are two memos you drafted as a law 
clerk to Justice Rutledge during the 1947 Term. As is now well 
known, your memo in Ahrens v. Clark was heavily incorporated into 
Justice Rutledge’s dissent, which argued that the presence of a 
habeas petitioner in the territory of a federal district court was not a 
jurisdictional requirement under the habeas statute. That dissent 
became the law in Braden v. 30th Judicial Court of Kentucky, and it 
formed the basis for your own opinion for the Court in Rasul v. Bush, 
holding that the habeas statute extended to petitioners held at 
Guantánamo Bay. 
Earlier that Term, and less well known, you wrote a memo to 
Justice Rutledge in Fisher v. Hurst. The petitioner, an African 
American woman, was seeking to obtain a writ of mandamus to 
compel the Oklahoma Supreme Court to comply with the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Sipuel v. Board of Regents, requiring 
the state to give her adequate access to a public legal education. You 
advised Justice Rutledge to take judicial notice that “the doctrine of 
segregation is itself a violation of the Constitutional requirement.” 
The rest was history. 
By my count that’s at least four called shots to one. I’ll say—
since you never would—that you had the better career. 
 
Warmest wishes, 
 
Jamal Greene 
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Melissa Hart* 
Reflecting on the year that I had the extraordinary fortune to 
clerk for Justice John Paul Stevens (1996–1997), two moments stand 
out for me as representative of the great empathy and respect for the 
law that made him an exceptional Justice. 
One of the things that surprised me about clerking on the 
Supreme Court was the amount of time that law clerks spent on death 
penalty work. Justice Stevens’ clerks spent slightly more time than 
clerks in other chambers because he required us to write a memo on 
every cert petition in a capital case. He reasoned that the cost of 
missing an important question in just one of these petitions—the 
death of a man who was improperly convicted or even actually 
innocent—was so high that he wanted to be sure each petition was 
given serious attention. Then there were the capital cases that the 
Court heard on the merits—several in the year I clerked, including 
one that came to the Court through a petition for stay of execution. 
And for clerks in every chamber, there were a certain number of 
nights in each month that we were responsible for staying at the 
Court until a scheduled execution had occurred; our job was to be 
ready in case a motion for a stay of execution came in. When they 
did, we would review the claims, discuss the issues with the clerks in 
other chambers, talk with our respective Justices and notify the Clerk 
of the Court whether there were the necessary five votes to stay the 
execution (there almost never were). 
At that time, Justice Stevens had not yet concluded that the 
death penalty was itself cruel and unusual punishment. We talked 
about the issue frequently, and he was careful in this as in other 
contexts to distinguish between what he might prefer as a matter of 
policy and what he read the Constitution to require or to prohibit. He 
did take very seriously arguments that particular methods of 
execution might be impermissibly painful, that a man or woman 
being put to death should have had all due process and effective 
representation, and that there might be certain categories of crime, or 
of perpetrator, where the death penalty would be inappropriate. So 
when we received petitions for a stay of execution, they always 
warranted careful evaluation. 
 
 * Clerk to Justice John Paul Stevens, October Term 1996. Associate Professor of Law, 
Director of the Byron R. White Center, University of Colorado Law School. 
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One night in late March 1997, I was the clerk responsible for 
reviewing a last-minute stay request on an execution scheduled to 
take place in Florida. On this particular night, Pedro Medina’s 
lawyers asked the Supreme Court to stay his execution in light of 
evidence that he might actually be innocent of the murder for which 
he was convicted. Medina was a Cuban who had come to the United 
States as part of the Mariel boatlift. In addition to the actual- 
innocence argument, his lawyers argued that he was so mentally ill 
that execution was an inappropriate punishment. Though both 
arguments had some significant support, the procedural intricacies of 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act posed 
insurmountable barriers to Medina’s claims. Ultimately, the votes 
needed to stay the execution were not there. Pedro Medina was 
executed that night in Florida, in a process that made national news 
as Florida’s “Old Sparky” malfunctioned. Witnesses to the event 
described a twelve-inch crown of flames shooting out of Medina’s 
head. 
It was, frankly, a deeply troubling event to have played any part 
in—even just the part of a law clerk evaluating the legal arguments 
thousands of miles removed from either the underlying crime or the 
execution. And when Justice Stevens came in to the office the next 
morning, he knew that. He walked up to my desk, looked at me 
gravely and said, “I am so sorry.” 
I knew that his empathy for me was only one piece of what he 
was expressing in those words. Without being self-important or over-
emotional, Justice Stevens had a sense of personal responsibility for 
the decisions he took part in. 
Eleven years later, in Baze v. Rees,11 Justice Stevens penned an 
eloquent concurring opinion explaining that he had become 
persuaded that “current decisions by state legislatures, by the 
Congress of the United States, and by this Court to retain the death 
penalty as a part of our law are the product of habit and inattention 
rather than an acceptable deliberative process . . . .”12 His opinion 
catalogs the many deep flaws in the justifications for and 
administration of capital punishment in the United States. “I have 
relied on my own experience in reaching the conclusion that the 
 
 11. 553 U.S. 35 (2008). 
 12. Id. at 78 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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imposition of the death penalty represents ‘the pointless and needless 
extinction of life with only marginal contributions to any discernible 
social or public purposes . . . .’”13 
My experience was just one year of what Justice Stevens had 
seen for almost thirty when he wrote his concurring opinion in Baze. 
The careful years of thought, the accumulation of experience, the 
empathy for victims and their families, for the families of those 
executed, for the participants in the process of imposing death—to 
have just one conversation with Justice Stevens about capital 
punishment is to see the mind and heart of a man who carried the 
responsibility of this question with care and a real sense of its 
weight. 
Despite his firm personal conviction that capital punishment was 
a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and 
unusual punishment, Justice Stevens’ decision in Baze was a 
concurrence, not a dissent. He took precedent seriously and until a 
majority of the Justices was willing to reconsider the 
constitutionality of the death penalty, he treated the Court’s 
precedent as binding. 
This respect for the principles of stare decisis was just one part 
of Justice Stevens’ larger, deep respect for the law. For me, one of 
the interesting ways in which this respect was most evident was in a 
real appreciation for the practice of law. Before he joined the 
Seventh Circuit in 1970, Justice Stevens was a lawyer for more than 
two decades. As a judge, he never forgot about being a lawyer. 
The Supreme Court is often criticized for decisions that are 
either ignorant about or indifferent to how law actually happens in 
district courts or in the offices of attorneys advising their clients. 
Justice Stevens was neither ignorant nor indifferent; instead he 
always thought seriously about the consequences that Supreme Court 
decisions would have for litigants and for their advocates. When we 
talked about the cases the Court heard during the 1996 Term, he 
often reflected on how a particular rule would operate in practice. He 
enjoyed talking about the quality of the lawyering reflected in the 
record, as well as the quality of the work being done by advocates in 
front of the Supreme Court. And I will never forget the best career 
advice I have ever received. Very near the end of the Term, Justice 
 
 13. Id. at 86 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (White, J., concurring)). 
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Stevens came into my office and cautioned me against going too 
quickly into legal academia. “Go be a lawyer,” he said, with a smile. 
As a teacher of Civil Procedure and Employment Discrimination 
today, I often find myself talking with my students about opinions—
both majority and dissent—authored by Justice Stevens. I don’t 
always agree with his outcome or his reasoning. But his sensitivity to 
the consequences of the Court’s decisions is evident in nearly every 
case. Justice Stevens had a remarkable ability to empathize—with his 
clerks, with his colleagues (even when they disagreed), with the 
lawyers and the parties in the cases he considered, and more 
generally with the people who would feel the consequences of the 
Court’s interpretation of the law. 
Justice requires both empathy and respect for the law. John Paul 
Stevens is a man who embodied those qualities of (a) Justice, and it 
is an honor to participate in this tribute to him. 
 
 
 
*** 
 
 
 
Amanda Leiter* 
Dear Justice Stevens: 
Many others have written about your contributions to the law, 
including the law of workplace equality. I’m writing to you in your 
capacity as an employer, to thank you for always and 
unselfconsciously practicing what you preached. 
When you first interviewed me for a clerkship, I was three 
months pregnant. When I started the job about a year later, my son 
was exactly six months old. Throughout that year, you regularly 
asked me about him—you were interested in what he was learning to 
do, who was watching him while I was at work, whether he had yet 
learned to sleep through the night, to crawl, to walk, to say “mama.” 
Late in the year, you asked him—then a toddler—to “help” you tie 
your famous bowtie. He was welcome in the courthouse and even in 
 
 * Clerk to Justice John Paul Stevens, October Term 2003. 
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your Chambers. He first learned to crawl up stairs by exploring, after 
hours, the many marble staircases that connect the upper and lower 
offices of your and the other Justices’ Chambers. 
Your attitude toward my son was unfailingly warm. Yet equally 
important, you never once suggested that I take a lighter load as the 
only clerk (of four) with a child. You never asked whether I could 
handle the workload in spite of my often sleepless nights. You never 
suggested that I take on less than my fair share of the Court’s saddest 
late-night work: waiting for and reviewing last-minute execution 
appeals. Rather, you respected each of us enough to treat us all 
equally, confident that whatever our individual obligations outside 
the courthouse, we would find a way to give our work the time, 
attention, and dedication it deserved. 
You showed that same generosity of spirit in the summer of 
2009, when I was home with my second baby, and you called to ask 
whether I’d enjoy arguing a case before the Court. You asked about 
the baby, a little girl. You even noted that the timing was imperfect 
for me to take on such a significant project. But the very fact of your 
call made clear to me that you expected I could handle the challenge. 
And your belief in me gave me the courage and confidence to do just 
that. 
I will always be grateful to you for giving me these 
opportunities, and for expecting me, and everyone you hired, to 
perform up to our best abilities. You taught me, by example, that the 
essence of workplace equality is employer respect. I know that all of 
your former employees learned that lesson from you, and we all feel 
the consequent obligation: not just to rise to the career challenges 
that confront us, but also, more important, to embrace our 
employees’ differences, and then to expect the most from each of 
them, regardless of those differences. 
 
Thank you, now and always, 
 
Amanda Leiter 
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Gregory P. Magarian* 
Supreme Court Justices leave behind formidable written records 
on which we can fixate. We inevitably lose sight, however, of the 
human beings who wrote the opinions—their personalities, their 
physical presences, how they dealt with other people. Because very 
few people ever see the Justices do or even discuss their work, the 
passage of time exacts an especially heavy cost in lost insights. 
Justice John Paul Stevens is too modest, and too dedicated to the 
ideal of impartial, analytically rigorous judging, to overestimate how 
much he and his colleagues cast the law in their own images. Even 
so, I think he would acknowledge that a Justice’s personal qualities 
necessarily influence his or her judicial writings. Justice Stevens’ 
voluminous body of opinions documents his deep commitments to 
such crucial principles as inclusive public discourse, the separation 
of church and state, and equal opportunity regardless of race or 
gender. Having had the honor and pleasure of working under the 
Justice for a year that passed too quickly, too long ago (OT 1994), I 
want to share a few subjective impressions of the man—one who 
played a pivotal role in guiding our law from the twentieth century 
into the twenty-first. 
Justice Stevens moves and speaks with a tranquil aspect, never 
in a rush, always with purpose. He has a way of making any person 
with whom he is talking—even a socially awkward recent law school 
graduate who has just stumbled into his chambers for a clerkship 
interview—feel immediately at ease. By all accounts he can be very 
intense, especially on the tennis court or the golf course, and I 
certainly have seen him animated. But during the year I spent in his 
chambers, I never saw him agitated or upset. Even when he returned 
from conferences with deep concerns about some of his colleagues’ 
positions or arguments, or had to stare down the clock on an 
especially wrenching execution night, he remained calm, self-
possessed, seemingly at peace. He never did or said anything that 
projected egotism (except for the occasional gleeful report of a 
victory at tennis), but he radiated the kind of quiet confidence that 
made the people around him feel secure and capable of doing their 
best work. I have never met anyone with a comparable aura of 
 
 * Clerk to Justice John Paul Stevens, October Term 1994. Professor of Law, Washington 
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gravitas that had less to do with any conscious effort to project 
gravitas. The Justice is a private person, in the sense that he does not 
readily talk about his personal life or probe into the personal lives of 
the people around him, but his manner is warm, welcoming, and 
friendly. His laughter, like his speech, flows easily, gently, and 
always sincerely. At some point in his life, he must have borne 
someone an ill thought or even let loose with a harsh word—but I 
cannot imagine how a harsh word from him would sound. 
Justice Stevens genuinely seemed to enjoy talking with his 
clerks. Before each argument session he gathered us around him on 
the comfortable chairs in our office space to discuss the upcoming 
cases. He struck a thoughtful tone in those discussions, even as to 
cases about which he presumably had strong views, I think because 
he believed his job at that stage in the process was to ponder rather 
than to declare. He listened to our earnest briefings with far closer 
attention than his wealth of legal knowledge made necessary. After 
the Court’s conferences he would reconvene us in the same spot. He 
engrossed and delighted us by sharing his detailed impressions about 
the votes and comments of the Justices, and he used these talks to 
educate us about his initial strategies for assigning opinions or 
drafting them himself. That he had before 1994 developed a 
reputation as a sort of quirky iconoclast on the Court seems 
incredible in retrospect; that year, his first as the senior “liberal” 
Justice, immediately revealed him as an adept and creative tactician. 
He liked the new responsibility. My co-clerks and I well remember 
his sly smile when he told us, early in the Term, that he would keep 
an interesting First Amendment majority opinion for himself.  
Justice Stevens famously wrote his own first drafts, and more 
importantly he carefully planned and instructed us on his reasoning 
and rhetoric, but he gave us room to contribute—subject to careful 
review. I will never forget the day that, out of some combination of 
hubris and frustration, I made additions to the end of a draft dissent, 
putting an outrageous position in the Justice’s mouth. After reading 
the draft, he walked into the clerks’ office with his usual even gait, 
and told me, with no trace of anger or impatience: “This looks good, 
but I think I’d like to make a few changes in the last section.” 
I have never heard Justice Stevens declaim loudly, or quietly, 
about any of the deep values that animated his jurisprudence. He let 
his opinions do the vocal work, and he honored his commitments to 
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justice and fairness simply by treating the people around him—
litigants, his colleagues, his staff—justly and fairly. When he has 
spoken out publicly about issues that matter to him, such as capital 
punishment, his tone has tended toward the analytical rather than the 
polemical. I think this sense of reserve and decorum has helped him 
to muster both the energy and the moral authority that he has 
sustained over a lifetime of public service. No young lawyer could 
hope for a better role model. 
 
 
 
*** 
 
 
 
Adam M. Samaha* 
One day, early in my clerkship with Justice Stevens, I went into 
his office to discuss something or other. I no longer recall the subject 
of our conversation. But I do remember that we began discussing a 
judicial opinion that Justice Stevens wanted to review. “Let me pull 
it up on Westlaw,” he said, turning to his computer. And I thought to 
myself, “Alright, he knows about Westlaw. Impressive technology 
awareness for someone from his generation.” Then he said, “Now let 
me get rid of the headnotes.” And I thought to myself, “Wait a 
minute, you can get rid of the headnotes on Westlaw?” I spent the 
rest of my clerkship trying to catch up with Justice Stevens, 
technologically and otherwise. 
Thankfully, Justice Stevens did not make it artificially easy to 
catch up with him. He set a vigorous intellectual pace even as he 
demonstrated civility, good humor, and ease with the burdens of 
judgment. This made his chambers a remarkable learning 
environment. The work was not easy, of course, and I faced a 
personal challenge. I have a neuromuscular disability called dystonia, 
which is in some ways unsightly and which interferes with the 
accomplishment of many simple physical tasks. But technology—as 
Justice Stevens well understood—is an equalizer for people with 
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disabilities. And I was quietly encouraged by Justice Stevens’ 
confidence in my ability to serve, along with a casual remark that he 
made one day. 
When my disability attracted a journalist’s attention, Justice 
Stevens was asked to comment and he released a statement: “I will 
simply tell you that I applied the same standards in hiring my three 
current clerks that I have always employed and that their work so far 
this term has confirmed my judgment that they were the best 
qualified candidates available when I hired them.” I was grateful for 
that message. We briefly discussed the situation in his chambers. “To 
tell you the truth,” he said, referring to my disability, “you don’t 
really notice it after a while.” I was grateful for that, too. 
I suppose that all of us want to be treated as unique individuals 
sometimes—with special talents, interests, even faults. But there are 
occasions when it is best to be seen as an undifferentiated member of 
a team—with potentially distinguishing features stripped away like a 
distracting headnote. As a judge, Justice Stevens demonstrated a 
special ability to concentrate on what mattered, to put aside what did 
not, and to provide a model of intellectual engagement and respect 
for everyone else. The Nation has never had a finer judge. It was an 
honor to work for him and to learn from him. 
 
 
 
*** 
 
 
 
Samuel Spital* 
Dear Justice Stevens, 
This letter is difficult to write. You taught me more about law, 
and about life, than I can begin to describe here. I decided to focus 
on just one of your many remarkable qualities: your modesty. 
In light of the central, but complex, role of unelected, life-
tenured Article III judges in our democratic society, modesty is oft-
invoked as an essential judicial virtue—although even the best jurists 
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sometimes disagree about what that means in practice. I believe you 
represent judicial modesty at its finest. 
In their statements upon your retirement, Justice Scalia twice 
referred to your brilliance, and Justice Alito noted that you “will 
surely be remembered as one of the most important Justices to serve 
on the Court.” I do not think it is an exaggeration to say that you are 
widely recognized as among the greatest legal minds in our nation’s 
history. Yet, when deciding cases before the Court, your intellect did 
not close your mind or distract you from your role as a judge. You 
never thought you knew it all in advance. Rather, you carefully 
considered the relevant facts and legal authorities, as well as the 
points made by your colleagues, the court below, counsel, and your 
clerks, before making your final decision. 
Even after reaching your considered judgment in a case, your 
modesty remained. When the majority of the Court disagreed with 
you, you applied the principles of stare decisis seriously and fairly in 
the next case. And you never invalidated a state or federal statute 
because you believed it was bad public policy. This is not to say that 
you confused modesty with abdication of your independence or 
judicial responsibility. You did not substitute your views for those of 
legislative bodies in matters of policy, but you were vigilant in 
protecting federal constitutional rights. You applied the Court’s 
precedent fairly but not blindly: when there was a special 
justification for declining to adhere to a prior decision, you would 
not do so. 
Your modesty not only made you a better jurist, it made you a 
more influential one. In a substantial number of cases, you convinced 
your colleagues that a prior case had been wrongly decided, and your 
dissenting position later became the holding of the Court. I believe 
this was, in part, due to the modesty of your dissents. Careful not to 
overstate the majority’s reasoning or holding, you cared about 
analysis, not rhetoric. You once explained to me that an argument I 
proposed adding to a dissent was not helpful because it showed only 
that the majority was wrong, not that we were right. You taught me 
that modest writing is more persuasive writing (and not only because 
briefs and opinions sound stronger without extraneous adverbs).  
You are modest not only as a Justice, but as an employer and 
mentor. I wish those who view judges as elitist or out-of-touch could 
spend time with you so they could see how down-to-earth, 
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considerate, and kind you are. 
Some of the most special memories I have from clerking for you 
are the stories you shared about your clerkship with Justice Rutledge. 
I know I speak for my fellow clerks when I say that you have 
inspired us every bit as much as he inspired you. 
 
Samuel Spital  
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